One of the most revealing omissions from the CARICOM ten-point plan is the absence of any end point. The plan does not say: if Britain does these ten things, the reparatory claim will be considered satisfied and no further demands will be made. There is no statement of what would constitute full satisfaction of the claim.
This absence is not accidental. A claim with no end point can always generate further demands. Whatever Britain does, it can be presented as partial progress toward an undefined goal. The absence of an end point means there is no negotiating counterparty who can offer closure in exchange for concessions. Whatever concessions Britain makes, the campaign continues.
Compare this to the German Holocaust reparations, which involved negotiated agreements with defined obligations and a framework for what constituted satisfaction of specific claims. Or the Japanese American internment compensation, which identified specific eligible individuals, set a specific payment amount, and created a defined programme with a beginning and an end. These programmes produced closure because they were designed to produce closure.
The CARICOM plan is designed differently. Its vagueness is a feature, not a bug. It preserves maximum flexibility for future demands and prevents any specific British action from being treated as final settlement. This design serves the political interests of the campaign’s advocates but is incompatible with the kind of negotiated resolution that would actually move the relationship between Britain and the Caribbean forward.
