CARICOM’s fifteen full member states have very different governance records, which matters considerably for assessing how any reparations payment would be used. The variation is substantial.
Barbados consistently scores well on governance indicators: relatively low corruption, functioning democratic institutions, and a track record of using public resources reasonably effectively. Trinidad and Tobago has significant oil wealth and above-average Caribbean development outcomes, though governance challenges including corruption in state enterprises are well documented. Several of the smaller Eastern Caribbean island states, including Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia, have relatively stable governance records.
At the other end of the spectrum, Haiti barely functions as a state in the conventional sense. Gang control of significant Haitian territory, the assassination of the President in 2021, and the collapse of basic public services represent governance failure of an extreme kind. Jamaica has persistent problems with political violence, gang patronage, and institutional corruption. Belize has faced governance challenges that have attracted international concern.
This variation means that a uniform payment to CARICOM governments would produce very different outcomes in different countries, depending on the governance capacity of the receiving government. A payment to Barbados might be used reasonably effectively. A payment to Haiti would almost certainly not benefit ordinary Haitians. Any serious reparations proposal would need to account for this variation, and the CARICOM plan does not.
